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7. Explaining property tax collections 
in developing countries: the case of 
Latin America
Cristian Sepulveda and 
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez*
1 INTRODUCTION
The property tax is arguably the most im portant source o f  own revenues 
for local governments around the world. M any fiscally decentralized econ­
omies as well as an increasing num ber o f  countries that have em barked 
upon a decentralization process look at the property tax as the main 
source of revenue autonom y for their subnational governments. This prac­
tice is well m atched with policy principles. There is widespread agreement 
am ong economists and decentralization experts that, although no t entirely 
perfect, the property tax possesses several characteristics that are desirable 
in the context o f  subnational government finance.
Besides its theoretical advantages, however, in practice all is not well 
with the property tax. It is difficult to implement, costly to administer, and 
unpopular am ong taxpayers. It is well known that many countries around 
the world struggle to produce any significant am ounts o f revenue from 
this tax source. These difficulties are more prevalent among developing 
countries and, particularly in Latin America, the property tax continues 
to  be a predom inant policy concern am ong policy makers. W ith very 
few exceptions, Latin American countries have not been able to  develop 
revenue-productive property tax systems. Moreover, Latin America has 
been identified in the economic literature as a region with relatively low tax 
effort (Bird et al., 2006), and with a level o f  tax revenue perform ance that 
is lower than the average in developing and transition countries (Ahmad 
and Brosio, 2008; Bird et al., 2008). The problems o f low tax effort and 
revenue perform ance are especially acute and challenging in the case of 
the property tax.
The main objective o f this chapter is to analyze the causes o f the poor 
tax perform ance of the property tax in Latin America and to  identify
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policies that could help with the current impasse. Part o f  what we find is 
conventional wisdom. The lack of financial and technical means to assem­
ble accurate, comprehensive and updated cadastres (property registers) 
is clearly one o f the main reasons explaining the lackluster performance 
o f the property tax. In fact, there is an extensive literature addressing 
these issues and suggesting more feasible alternatives to  the assessment of 
property values. All these lessons are relevant to Latin America and they 
should be internalized by policy makers. But we also arrive at less conven­
tional findings. Previous analyses o f the performance o f the property tax 
have given much less attention to the design o f the fiscal decentralization 
system within which the property tax must operate. The arrangem ent of 
fiscal incentives in the decentralization system, we contend, can also play 
a crucial role in determining the extent to  which the property tax is used 
in practice. We argue that the realignment o f fiscal incentives must be an 
im portant part o f the solution for a more effective use o f the property tax 
in the region.
We emphasize the m utual dependence between a sound fiscal decen­
tralization process and the successful devolution of the property tax to 
local governments. In order to become a productive revenue source, the 
decentralization o f  the property tax also requires that local authorities 
be politically accountable to their communities, be endowed with a sig­
nificant degree o f fiscal autonom y, face the correct incentives within the 
context o f central government policies, and have sufficient administrative 
capacity to carry out tax and expenditure policies.
A few words on the scope o f the chapter are in order. The concept o f 
property is a broad one, encompassing different forms o f wealth over 
which different taxes can be applied. In general, we can differentiate 
between real or immovable property, which includes land and structures, 
from personal property, consisting of those tangible and intangible assets 
that are not attached to  the land. In addition, taxes can be applied to the 
stock o f  properties, their transfer, or the capital gains realized on their 
sale. This chapter focuses on the annual taxation o f the stock of immov­
able property, which is generally considered among the most efficient 
modes of property taxation and constitutes the bulk o f  property tax 
revenues around the w orld.1
In this chapter we also distinguish between the analysis of property 
tax collections at the subnational level within a country and that across 
countries. We explain that certain variables that are exogenous for sub­
national governments within a country, such as the legal and institutional 
frameworks, are likely to be endogenously determined at the country level, 
and thus they should also be considered as com ponents o f  the national 
tax effort. U nfortunately, the inform ation available at the subnational
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government level is, in general, still very limited, so the econometric 
analysis tends to be more informative at the international level. M oreover, 
even in that case, the data  available for Latin American countries are 
quite incomplete, which naturally limits the validity of our results. Our 
dataset consists of an unbalanced panel o f nine countries with years of 
observation covering the 1990-2007 period.
We suggest that the im provement o f property tax collections and the 
realization o f effective revenue autonom y may require, paradoxically, a 
more active involvement o f the central government in the implementation, 
adm inistration and collection o f  the property tax. The central govern­
ments in the region might provide technical and financial assistance to 
the less administratively developed local governments, and in some cases 
might temporarily retain some responsibilities over different aspects of 
this revenue source. In addition, the central government could contribute 
by helping to strengthen the relationship between autonom y and account­
ability at the subnational level, and by redesigning the intergovernm en­
tal transfer systems in a way that does not provide incentives to reduce 
subnational own-tax collections.
The rest o f the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide 
an overview o f the main characteristics and im portance o f the property 
tax in Latin America. In Section 3 we evaluate the property tax in terms of 
the desirable properties o f  a good subnational tax. In Section 4 we develop 
an analytical framework in which we identify the determining factors of 
tax collection performance o f subnational governments. This analytical 
framework provides a sounder basis for the com parison o f  perform ­
ances of subnational governments within a country and across different 
countries, where performance is m easured on the basis o f actual revenue 
collections vis-a-vis the potential collections reflected by existing fiscal 
capacities. In Section 5 we present the empirical analysis. The last section 
concludes.
2 PROPERTY TAXATION IN LATIN AMERICA
Despite the generally accepted potential o f property taxes in tax systems 
all over the world, in practice they are a m inor source of public revenues, 
specially by com parison to other taxes also commonly used worldwide 
such as income taxes, VAT or sales taxes. The property tax is especially 
far from being a m ainstay o f the revenue system in developing and 
transitional countries.
To put the perform ance o f property taxes in Latin America into per­
spective, we com pare it with the perform ance o f  other regions o f the
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Table 7.1 Property tax as a share o f  GDP in representative groups o f  
countries (% )
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s*
All countries 0.77 0.73 0.75 1.04
(number o f countries) (37) (49) (59) (65)
OECD countries 1.24 1.31 1.44 2.12
(number o f  countries) (16) (18) (16) (18)
Transition countries 0.34 0.59 0.54 0.68
(number o f  countries) (1) (4) (20) (18)
Developing countries 0.42 0.36 0.42 0.60
(number o f countries) ' (20) (27) (23) (29)
Latin American countries - 0.36 0.37
(number o f countries) (8) (10)
Note: Figures in parentheses represent the number o f countries considered in each 
computation.
* The data for 2000s are for five years from 2000 to 2004.
Sources: Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008) and CEPAL.
world. As shown in Table 7.1, property taxes in developing and transi­
tional countries raise less revenue relative to  G D P than O ECD  countries. 
In the early 2000s property taxes in O EC D  countries represented 2.12 
percent o f G D P, while for developing countries this figure was 0.6 percent 
and, for transition countries, 0.68 percent. The trend for revenues in all 
three groups o f countries has been slightly upwards since the 1970s. The 
figures in Table 7.1 suggest that the overall performance o f the property 
tax in terms o f G D P  is associated with the level o f economic development; 
for example, O EC D  countries rely more on the property tax than do devel­
oping countries. However, that relationship is not necessarily m onotonic 
and Latin American countries are found to perform less well than the 
average developing country.
Table 7.2 presents the measures o f property tax performance for some 
Latin American countries. Even though the reliance on the property tax 
is low, there is still a significant degree o f variation across countries. For 
example, in Peru property tax revenues in recent years (2005-07) repre­
sent 0.16 percent o f  G D P, while in Bolivia (Plurinational State of) for 
the same period that figure is about four times larger, at 0.62 percent of 
G D P. There is no clear trend over time but on average the relative im por­
tance o f property taxes has decreased. There are also some cases where 
property tax perform ance has consistently increased over time, such as 
in Brazil, Colom bia, Ecuador and Guatem ala; while in Mexico property
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Table 7.2 Reliance on the property tax  as a share o f  GDP in Latin 
American countries
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07
Argentina 0.65 0.62 0.59 0.44
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) - 0.69 0.62
Brazil 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.44
Chile 0.55 0.65 0.70 0.59
Colombia 0.25 0.46 0.48 0.54
Ecuador 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.14
Guatemala 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.16
Mexico 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
Paraguay - 0.36 0.39 -
Peru - - 0.17 0.16
Uruguay 0.52 0.70 0.71 -
Latin American countries 0.33 0.40 0.38 0.36
Source: CEPAL.
taxes have represented 0.18 percent o f  G D P, w ithout changing since the 
early 1990s.
Central to this chapter is the question o f which factors may help explain 
variations in the use o f property taxes in Latin America. It seems quite 
certain that property taxes remain the great unrealized promise for local 
tax autonom y. Like in some other regions of the world, the yield of the 
property tax remains lower than its potential; but in Latin America 
the distance between potential and reality appears to  be m uch larger, 
and the reasons for this are multiple. In this chapter we explore several 
o f  these, including low political will and disincentive effects o f  revenue 
sharing and transfers, and outdated and poorly equipped tax adm inistra­
tions. These factors would seem to translate into generous exemptions 
and low tax rates, obsolete and infrequent property value assessments, 
incomplete registries and cadastres and lack o f willingness and means o f 
enforcing collections.
This lackluster perform ance o f property taxes in Latin America and 
the differences observed am ong countries are likely to  be related to the 
different arrangem ents for discretion on rate setting o r adm inistration of 
the property tax. Some o f the main institutional features in the assign­
ment and adm inistration o f the property tax across Latin American 
countries are presented in Appendix Table 7A.1.2 For the most part, Latin 
American countries assign the property tax to  municipal governments, 
although there are ‘full’ exceptions such as the case of the Dominican
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Republic where this tax remains a central tax, and ‘partial’ exceptions 
where some authority  over taxes remains at the central level (for example, 
Brazil for rural taxes, G uatem ala, and Panam a) or at the provincial level 
(Argentina). In m ost cases, municipalities are also given some authority to 
change tax rates, a t times within legislated limits, but here there are also 
exceptions. For example, Chile does not give that authority to the munici­
palities, and the states o r provinces in Mexico and Argentina also share in 
that authority. For the adm inistration o f the tax, the central governments 
(the provinces in the case o f  Argentina) are most frequently responsible for 
updating the cadastre', in Costa Rica, H onduras, and Mexico the cadastre 
is a municipal function. In terms o f assigning the responsibility for billing 
and collections there are a large variety o f practices with these functions 
at times exclusively assigned to the central or municipal governments and 
other times shared by different levels of government. Finally, the predomi­
nant approach to  the assessment o f properties is market valuation.
A priori, we can theorize on the positive and negative aspects o f the 
assignment o f specific functions vis-a-vis the revenue productivity o f prop­
erty taxes. For example, the assignment o f administrative functions at the 
municipal level may have certain advantages, such as better information 
about the properties and potentially stronger incentives to collect taxes, 
but the central authorities might also have advantages, such as better- 
skilled and better-rem unerated officials and stronger authority  to make 
things happen. In the next section we explore in more depth the role of 
property taxation in financing local governments and the advantages 
and disadvantages o f different adm inistrative schemes. Ultimately, we 
shall rely on our empirical analysis to discern the direction and statistical 
significance o f the effects o f different adm inistrative arrangem ents on tax 
collections from the property tax.
3 THE ROLE OF PROPERTY TAXATION ON LOCAL 
G O V E R N M E N T  FIN AN C IN G
There is widespread agreement am ong economists and policy makers 
about the appropriateness and convenience of assigning the property 
tax to  local governments. Indeed, while the theoretical normative analy­
ses developed in the economic literature suggest that the property tax 
is a good source o f  local government revenue, in practice most o f  the 
decentralized economies in the world have assigned, at least partially, the 
responsibility over the property tax to  local governments. This matching 
o f theory and practice, however, does not imply that the decentralization 
o f the property tax has always been carried out in accordance with the
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norm ative prescriptions developed in the economic literature. In many 
cases, either because o f the difficulties associated with its implementation, 
or because o f poorly designed incentives, the property tax has not become 
a significant source o f revenues.
The economic role currently assigned to property taxation has been 
shaped by a vast and longstanding literature analyzing the advantages and 
disadvantages o f alternative tax revenue sources. In this section we briefly 
describe the economic argum ents used to  recommend the property tax 
as one o f the m ajor sources o f  own local government revenues. We start 
by discussing the general characteristics o f  good tax revenue sources, in 
general and at the local level, and then we briefly stress the im portance of 
tax revenue autonom y in a decentralized system o f government.
A Preliminary Evaluation of Subnational Property Taxation
Tax policy is carried out in complex environm ents where institutional, 
cultural, political, and economic variables interact in order to determine 
not only the economic effects o f certain tax instrum ents, but also their fea­
sibility as policy tools. In reality, there are no easy answers regarding the 
desirability o f one tax instrum ent over another, and economists usually 
rely on a set o f widely accepted criteria or principles in order to describe a 
‘good tax’ and evaluate the appropriateness o f alternative tax instruments. 
Among the most commonly used principles we find the following:
•  Efficiency A tax should not induce significant behavioral responses 
of individuals and firms; in o ther words, it should not distort the 
adequate allocation o f resources in the economy. When taxpayers 
bear their burden in accordance with the benefit they receive (that 
is, when the ‘benefit principle' is fulfilled) then the tax approxim ates 
the role o f a user fee and is considered as an efficient tax. Indeed, 
the behavioral responses induced by (rightly set) user fees can be 
interpreted as the result o f a correcting incentive (similar to what 
happens in private m arkets), because the adjustm ent in the behavior 
o f the individual or the firm is made in order to pay the correct price 
o f the public good.
•  Equity and fairness The principle o f  horizontal equity calls for (or 
regards as fair) an equal treatm ent o f taxpayers in identical condi­
tions. In contrast, the concept o f vertical equity allows for several 
possible arrangem ents in which a tax can be said to be regressive, 
proportional or progressive as long as the tax burden increases in 
a lower, equal or higher proportion with the ability to pay. The 
ability-to-pay principle states that taxpayers with greater ability to
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pay should bear a greater tax burden, but the judgm ent on what is 
to be considered fair is a m atter to be solved by each community or 
society. In any case, in order to become a good revenue source, a tax 
should be considered fair by the taxpayers.
•  Revenue adequacy A tax should raise a significant am ount o f rev­
enues relative to the costs o f collection and expenditure needs o f a 
government. In addition, the tax base should be stable and rather 
insensitive to cyclical fluctuations.
•  Low costs o f  administration and compliance Adm inistration costs 
reduce the share o f  tax collections available to finance public goods 
and services. Similarly, compliance costs reduce the share of taxpay­
ers’ income available for private consum ption. If these costs are 
relatively high then other tax revenue sources might be preferable.
•  Political acceptability A tax that is not acceptable either to the tax­
payers or to a  significant portion o f  the political class might simply 
be impossible to implement. Even if it is implemented, in order to be 
successful, a tax requires a high degree o f cooperation o f all relevant 
agents and institutions. Failing to reach this cooperation might 
result in low voluntary compliance, inadequate or unrealistic laws, 
and deficient enforcement.
•  Minimize tax  avoidance and tax evasion A tax should not induce 
significant, legal or illegal, efforts to  elude the tax burden. Both 
types o f responses erode the tax base, create deviations from the tar­
geted incidence, distort the relative prices in the economy and might 
aggravate problem s in horizontal and vertical equity.
N o tax instrum ent perfectly fulfills all these principles nor could it be 
considered as superior to all alternative tax instrum ents in all conditions. 
In reality, although these principles of taxation serve as a guide to describe 
the characteristics o f a ‘good’ tax instrum ent, they must be evaluated 
in the specific context where a tax is implemented. A general evaluation 
o f  the property tax, therefore, can be expected to  lead to  different conclu­
sions depending on its structure, whether the property tax is assigned to 
the central government or to the local governments, and so on.
Table 7.3 summarizes the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
assigning the property tax to the central or to the local governm ents.’ 
Local governments have an advantage in terms o f economic efficiency 
because their proxim ity to the taxpayers allows them to better fulfill the 
benefit principle. Indeed, the central government is more subject to 
the ‘common pool problem ’, by which those who contribute to financing 
the public goods (the country as a whole if the tax is assigned to the center) 
are not necessarily the beneficiaries o f public expenditures. In general, the
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Table 7.3 Comparative analysis o f  property taxation at the central and 
local levels o f  government
Principle Property tax as a central 
government tax
Property tax as a local 
government tax
Efficiency
Equity and fairness
Revenue adequacy
Low administration
costs
Low compliance
costs
Political acceptability
Tax compliance
Disadvantage: the 
‘common pool 
problem’ increases 
with the size o f  the 
government 
Advantage', both vertical 
and horizontal 
disparities can be 
addressed at a national 
level
Advantage: less mobility 
and variability at the 
national level 
Advantage: better 
administrative and 
fiscal capacity 
Disadvantage: economies 
o f  scale might not be 
substantial
(Depend on the complexity 
taxpayers’ willingness to 
Disadvantage: the 
property tax is very 
visible
Disadvantage: inflexible 
terms and ‘common 
good problem’ 
reduce willingness to 
contribute
Advantage: the property 
tax approximates a user 
fee, especially as the 
jurisdiction size decreases
Disadvantage: 
heterogeneity and different 
tax bases impose unequal 
conditions in different 
jurisdictions 
Disadvantage: revenues can 
be more volatile in smaller 
jurisdictions 
Disadvantage:
implementation costs 
might simply be 
unaffordable 
Advantage: first-hand 
knowledge o f  the 
taxpayers and the tax base 
o f the system and the 
contribute)
Advantage: visibility 
helps to link taxation with 
public goods benefits and 
increases accountability 
Advantage: closer match o f  
taxpayers’ preferences and 
better knowledge o f their 
ability to pay
Source: A uthors'elaboration.
lower the size o f the jurisdiction and the greater the share o f the property 
tax on local revenues, the greater the ability o f local governm ents to use 
property taxation as a benefit tax.
The central government seems to have a clear advantage in terms of 
the ability to address the problem s o f  horizontal and vertical equity and
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fairness. Since M usgrave (1959) the economic literature distinguishes mac­
roeconomic stability, an equitable distribution of income and the efficient 
allocation of resources as the three fundam ental economic objectives of 
the (general) government, and broadly accepts that local involvement 
should be restricted only (or mostly) to  contribute to the objective of 
allocation efficiency. The reason is that local authorities cannot consider 
the m acroeconomic consequences o f their decisions, nor are they capable 
of, or interested in, ensuring fairness in the national context. According 
to this argum ent, local governments should not even intervene in redis­
tributive policies within their own jurisdictions, but rather might limit 
themselves to avoiding worsening the distribution o f income at the local 
level.4 This consideration is especially relevant in Latin America, a region 
where the distribution o f  income is am ong the worst in the world (Lopez 
and Perry, 2008).5
Independently from  the relative magnitude of property tax collections, 
the fact that mobility is lower at the national level implies that the prop­
erty tax collections would be more stable for the central government. At 
the local level individual taxpayers can move out as a response to exces­
sive tax rates and lower the m arket value o f properties. Firm s might also 
decide to  leave the jurisdiction and in that case, in addition to the property 
value effect, the loss in tax collections would be greater if commercial use 
is taxed more heavily than residential use.
Due to  their potentially significant magnitude, the adm inistration costs 
play a crucial role in determining the ability o f  a government to  adequately 
implement and collect the property tax. In particular, the assessment of 
property values is complex and requires well-prepared personnel; building 
a complete cadastre is a long and expensive task. In this context the central 
government usually has advantages in terms of its ability to finance and 
develop comprehensive cadastres. M oreover, local authorities in develop­
ing countries usually lack the enforcement mechanisms available to central 
governments, such as legal staff, the police, and other means to take 
advantage of their proximity to tax officials and taxpayers.
Im portantly, local property taxation might also have an advantage in 
terms o f  the political acceptability. One payment (or a few) per year of a 
relatively large am ount of money makes the property tax a visible and an 
unpopular revenue source. Local authorities are in a better position than 
the central governm ent to show the taxpayers the way in which property 
tax revenues are used to  finance public services, and therefore to justify the 
tax paym ents as a fair price for the benefits received. If local authorities 
m anage to effectively match public service provision with the preferences 
o f the com m unity, then the taxpayers might well feel inclined to voluntar­
ily comply with the tax law, reducing the practice o f tax evasion. In this
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sense, an adequate supply o f  public services might provide incentives to 
taxpayers to  remain in the jurisdiction even if tax rates are relatively high 
with respect to  neighboring areas. The local authorities also have a better 
knowledge o f  the taxpayers’ ability to pay inside the jurisdiction; thus they 
might be able to better m onitor and enforce compliance as well as make 
proper adjustm ents to the local tax policy. Torgler (2005b) finds that the 
size o f the informal sector is an im portant determ inant o f  tax compliance 
in Latin America. The informal sector represents an im portant share o f 
the economy in developing countries, and in Latin America is estimated 
to be around 41 percent o f the G N P  (Aim and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). 
The question is whether local governm ents can exploit their advantage o f 
being ‘closer’ to the constituencies in order to bring m ore activities into 
the formal sector and encourage increased voluntary compliance. Little 
research has been done on this issue.
In sum m ary, both central and local governm ents have advantages and 
disadvantages for adm inistering the property tax, and it is not possible 
to assert a priori which level will perform  better. In practice, however, 
their strengths can be com bined in mixed arrangem ents o f authority  and 
responsibilities. On the one hand, the visibility o f the property tax, usually 
considered as a disadvantage for the central government, is a key aspect of 
the problem that calls for a keen participation o f local authorities in rate 
setting and also in the adm inistration o f the property tax. At the local level 
the tax authorities might be able to  use such visibility to present the prop­
erty tax as a benefit tax, enhancing political acceptability and taxpayers’ 
participation in local decisions, and potentially reducing non-compliance. 
On the o ther hand, central government intervention might be helpful to 
develop comprehensive cadastres, to assist in the form ation o f adm inistra­
tive capacity and to provide policy param eters within which the creation 
o f inefficiencies can be contained.
The literature has identified a num ber o f  additional desirable features of 
a ‘good local tax’.6 Am ong these features we count, again, the correspond­
ence between tax paym ents and benefits received (benefit principle), the 
perception o f  fairness, and  the stability o f  revenue collections. In addition, 
and pondering some o f the argum ents provided earlier in this section, 
the visibility o f the tax instrum ent is considered as a good characteristic 
o f local taxation. O ther desirable features that are applicable specifically 
within the local context are:
•  The tax  base should be relatively immovable According to the 
T iebout’s (1956) hypothesis, taxpayers would ‘vote with their feet’ 
and efficiently reallocate themselves after considering the com bina­
tion o f  taxes and services offered by different local governments.
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In practice, however, tax competition among subnational govern­
ments might also lead to a 'race to the bottom ’, if local governments 
are forced to reduce their tax rates in order to retain the taxpayers 
inside the jurisdiction. As a result, the overall am ount o f  subnational 
public expenditures may remain at a suboptimal level.7 A con­
sensual, but ra ther conservative, position to deal with the unclear 
effects o f mobility in economic efficiency consists o f assuming that 
any fiscally induced change in taxpayers’ behavior represents a dis­
tortion o f the efficient allocation o f resources in the economy and 
consequently reduces economic welfare. Moreover, it is clear that 
a relatively immovable tax base would allow for more room in tax 
policy decisions.
•  The tax should be geographically neutral Taxes should not interfere 
with the commercial flow o f goods and services and business loca­
tion decisions across the jurisdictions. In this case we again assume 
that tax-induced changes of taxpayers’ behavior should be avoided.
•  Taxes should not be easily exported The benefit principle does not 
hold if non-residents are charged for the provision o f local services. 
In addition, such a situation implies that the costs assumed locally 
are reduced, which might also lead to overprovision o f public 
services.
•  Significant tax revenue sources should be evenly distributed among 
jurisdictions Sizable variations in the size o f the tax base create 
high fiscal disparities am ong jurisdictions and impose undesirable 
differences in the degree of revenue autonom y. In general, local gov­
ernments with m ore (less) revenue autonom y are also able to  exert 
more (less) discretion in their expenditure decisions, and this might 
translate into greater (lower) ability to  tailor the public service pro­
vision to the preferences o f the community. G reat differences in the 
size of the tax base, therefore, might generate discontent and even 
confusion regarding the importance o f own-revenue collections and, 
in general, the role o f local governments in a decentralized system.
The extent to which these conditions hold, or are adhered to in practice, 
is likely to vary from one tax instrum ent to another. In general, it seems 
reasonable to expect that only some taxes, if any, will satisfy all of them. 
For instance, there are few taxes that satisfy the benefit principle and are 
not exportable, am ong which the property tax and the tax on vehicles 
stand as the most typical examples. However, both o f these are subject 
to tax com petition, which can create economic inefficiencies and erode 
the tax bases. In addition, in most cases the magnitude o f the tax base 
varies significantly across jurisdictions, particularly between urban and
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rural areas. In this sense, we can also expect a certain degree o f correlation 
between the size o f the tax base and the adm inistrative capacity o f the local 
government, such that the initial disparities are aggravated by the relative 
difficulties in raising local revenues.
All things considered, the property tax represents a promising but still 
imperfect source o f own revenues at the local level. Even with significant 
decentralization of the property tax, poorer local governments will likely 
remain dependent on alternative sources o f  revenues, notably intergov­
ernmental transfers. In addition, special attention will be required to 
create a tradition o f taxpayers’ participation and voluntary compliance, 
and to provide the right incentives for efficient levels of tax effort by local 
governments.
The Importance o f Tax Revenue Autonomy
The decentralization theorem (Oates, 1972) states that if the decisions 
about the type and am ount o f public goods are allowed to be m ade locally, 
then the level o f social welfare would be greater with respect to a situa­
tion where public goods are centrally, and uniformly, determ ined for all 
localities. The reason is simply that the local governments are better able 
to tailor public goods provision to the particular needs and preferences of 
each jurisdiction.8
In order to adapt the type and am ount o f public goods to local needs 
and preferences, the local authorities require, by necessity, a certain degree 
o f  autonom y on their expenditure decisions. But even if granted by law, 
the expenditure autonom y cannot be practiced without sufficient techni­
cal and adm inistrative capacity and the ability to discretionally increase 
the am ount o f  local revenues. The existence o f  effective expenditure 
and revenue autonom y is widely recognized in the literature as a basic 
requirement for realizing the welfare gains o f fiscal decentralization. 
U nfortunately, this economic prescription does not always concur, and 
might even collide with, the practical drivers of decentralization. The inter­
national movement tow ards greater fiscal decentralization has responded 
more to political forces such as the dem and for deeper dem ocratization, 
the resolution o f ethnic conflicts, or the failure o f central governments in 
securing national objectives, than to  a search for greater economic effi­
ciency as portrayed in the decentralization theorem .9 In many countries 
the implementation o f an economically efficient decentralization design, 
although desirable, might well not be a priority.
According to  Ahmad and Brosio (2008), one o f the main factors weak­
ening the decentralization process in Latin America has been the lack of 
attention given to the subnational revenue assignments. In this context, it
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does not seem too audacious to suggest that the widespread decentraliza­
tion o f the property tax is partially explained by the fact that the central 
authorities have several more efficient, easier to administer, and less 
unpopular revenue sources under their control. Similarly, central au thori­
ties are usually reluctant to devolve effective autonom y to the subnational 
governments in most areas of taxation. The reason for this may be the 
lack o f  technical and adm inistrative capacity at the subnational level, but 
it is also reasonable to presume that central authorities are not willing to 
renounce their power over budgetary decisions.
In short, even though the choice of the property tax as a main source 
of local own revenues seems to be correct from an economic perspective, 
the assignment o f this revenue source to  the local governments by no 
means guarantees that local governments will be able to  exert expenditure 
autonom y in the margin and to realize the benefits o f decentralization.
4 EXPLAINING PROPERTY TAX COLLECTIONS:  
AN  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The am ount of property tax revenues that governments are able to collect 
varies widely across nations and across jurisdictions within any country, 
and depends on a wide range of institutional, cultural, political and eco­
nomic factors. The problem o f property tax collections (or the lack thereof) 
has been extensively analyzed in the economic literature. The complexities 
o f the problem and data  limitations, however, still impose severe restric­
tions on the empirical analyses; as a result, no conclusive answers have been 
reached about the factors determining property tax collections.
In this section we develop a model o f  property tax collections, show 
their dependency on the concept o f tax effort, and explain how the design 
and im plem entation o f  the fiscal decentralization process can affect 
the performance o f  the property tax. We begin by presenting a general 
model o f revenue collections and then we analyze, separately, the revenue 
collection problem at the subnational and national levels.
A Simple Model of Property Tax Collections
Following Bahl and M artinez-Vazquez (2008), and assuming that the 
property value assessment is based on market value, the am ount of 
property tax collections ( TC ) can be defined as:10
t c = T C ' J ± ' I A V ' T M V  
TL T A V  T M V  M V
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where
TL  : property tax liability,
TA V : taxable assessed value,
T M V  : taxable m arket value,
M V  : full m arket value.
The first term on the right-hand side, property tax collections over tax lia­
bility, corresponds to  the collection ratio. In the ideal case the am ount o f 
tax collections should be identical to the tax liabilities and this term would 
be equal to one. In practice, however, either the tax authorities might fail 
to properly enforce the tax law or the taxpayers might fail to comply with 
it; thus the collection ratio is norm ally lower than one. The value o f the 
collection ratio  can be interpreted as a measure o f  the observance o f the 
tax law and the ability o f  the authorities to enforce it through fines or even 
jail sentences. According to Bahl and M artinez-Vazquez (2008), a normal 
value for the collection ratio in developing countries is around 50 percent, 
which is explained as mainly due to lax tax enforcement, and in some cases 
can even be as low as 20 percent.
The second term on the right-hand side of equation (7.1), the share o f tax 
liabilities over taxable assessed value, is the statu tory  tax rate, usually set 
a t some value lower than 1 percent. The third term represents the assess­
ment ratio, the share of taxable assessed value on taxable m arket value, by 
which the law establishes the share o f  the taxable m arket value over which 
the tax liability is actually going to be com puted. When the assessment 
ratio is specified by law, then it normally takes a value between zero and 
one, but if it is not specified, then its implicit value is one. The assessment 
ratio is nothing more than an adjustm ent to the statutory tax rate and it is 
used to induce acceptability o f the tax system and reduce com plaints about 
the assessment criteria, because it gives taxpayers the impression that they 
are not being taxed for the full value o f their p roperty ." Finally, the fourth 
and fifth terms on the right-hand side o f equation (7.1) jointly  represent 
the tax base (TB)  that is actually available for taxation. The fourth  term is 
the ratio o f taxable m arket value over (full) m arket value, and summarizes 
all the effects o f  preferential treatm ents, exemptions on the tax base, and 
errors in assessing the true m arket value o f the property (the last term in 
the equation). Equation (7.1) can now be rewritten as:
TC
TC  =  —  • f  ■ TB, (7.2)
where f  is the statutory tax rate ‘adjusted’ by the assessment ratio.
As explained, the collection ratio measures the degree o f observance of
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the tax law, and can be different from one only in the presence of ‘distor­
tions’ imposed by the behavior o f government authorities o r taxpayers. 
There are several possible sources o f distortions that can explain a low 
degree o f  observance o f the tax law. On the government side, the tax law 
can be deficiently enforced (DE)  if the tax authorities are either unable 
or unwilling to  capture the whole revenue potential o f the property tax. 
We might also be in the presence o f corruption (C), in which case the tax 
authorities appropriate for themselves a share of the revenues collected.
On the taxpayers’ side, revenues might be lost due to tax evasion (£ ), 
generally defined as any illegal form of taxpayers' non-com pliance.12 The 
traditional model o f  tax evasion explains taxpayers' non-compliance by 
considering the probability o f auditing and detection, the cost of enforce­
ment and  the costs o f non-compliance, which can be summarized under 
the concept o f penalties (P ).13 In the case o f the property tax. however, 
illegal non-compliance is limited by the very nature o f the tax base. If 
properties are immovable, then they cannot easily be hidden from the 
tax authorities. As a result, tax evasion can take place only under certain 
circumstances. For instance, the taxpayers might take advantage o f the 
inability or unwillingness o f the tax authorities to correctly assess the value 
o f the property, or might also attem pt to lie in order to qualify for pref­
erential treatm ents and exemptions. In these cases the factor explaining 
tax evasion is deficient enforcement. Alternatively, corrupt tax authorities 
might accept bribes for reducing taxpayers’ tax bills.
A nother possible form  o f tax evasion consists o f simply refusing to pay 
the tax liabilities. This decision would be economically rational and even 
become a com m on practice, if taxpayers perceive that the tax law is not 
enforced or if the costs o f tax evasion are relatively low. In contrast, if the 
tax law specifies high penalties and is being properly enforced, then tax 
evasion would certainly be too costly and eventually lead to  the expropria­
tion o f  the property; thus it is less likely that the taxpayers would choose 
this strategy.
The economic literature has recently incorporated the concept o f tax 
morale ( T M ) in order to account for the fact that taxpayers are usually 
inclined to voluntarily comply with the tax law even in the absence o f effec­
tive enforcem ent.14 Analyzing opinion survey data from the United States 
and Turkey. Torgler et al. (2008) find that positive attitudes towards the 
tax authorities and the tax system as well as trust in public officials sig­
nificantly increase tax morale, while the perception o f corruption has the 
opposite effect. Additionally, Torgler (2005a) shows that the willingness to 
pay taxes increases with the level o f direct democracy in a jurisdiction. The 
evidence provided by the tax morale literature suggests, therefore, that tax 
evasion also depends on the taxpayers' perception about the behavior and
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performance o f the tax authorities, and the extent to  which they conform 
to the preferences o f  the community. In our model we summarize these 
determ inants o f tax morale with the concepts o f corruption and govern­
ment responsiveness (R ). Tax morale is expected to  decrease (and tax 
evasion to increase) with a higher perception o f corruption; the opposite 
would occur if the tax authorities are truthfully responsive to the prefer­
ences o f the taxpayers.
Summarizing, tax evasion can be said to  respond positively to  deficient 
enforcement and negatively to the size o f penalties and tax morale, and 
we can write in shorthand that E = E[D E , P, T M ( C , /?)]. Furtherm ore, 
the am ount o f  tax liabilities (TL)  can be decomposed into the observance 
o f the tax law, represented by tax collections TC , and the non-observance 
o f the tax law, represented by the tax revenues forgone due to  deficient 
enforcement DE,  corruption C, and tax evasion E:
Solving this equation for TC  and dividing by TL,  we can introduce it into 
equation (7.2) to  express the am ount o f  tax collections as:
where tax collections appear to be a function o f deficient enforcement, cor­
ruption, penalties o f tax evasion, governm ent responsiveness, the adjusted 
statutory tax rate, and the size of the tax base. The analytical advantage 
o f  equation (7.4) is that now tax collections are exclusively expressed as a 
function o f exogenous variables, which allows us to  more easily identify 
the factors that determine the actual am ount o f tax revenue collections.
The am ount o f  taxes a government is able to collect largely depends on 
policy variables that can be influenced either by the tax law or by the tax 
authorities. This conclusion stresses the role o f the tax laws and the respon­
sible government authorities as opposed to  the role o f taxpayers in explain­
ing tax collections. A government in need o f rising additional revenues is 
not limited to legally determining the tax rate and the tax base. In reality, 
several alternative channels might serve the same purpose. For instance, 
the tax law might incorporate measures to minimize and sanction corrup­
tion, set adequate levels o f  penalties for evasion, and restrict preferential 
treatm ents and exemptions. Alternatively, the tax authorities might choose 
to effectively enforce the tax law, improve the assessment process in order 
to more accurately measure the tax base, and to deepen the involvement 
o f taxpayers in the public spending decisions. As De Cesare (2002, p. 11)
TL = TC  + DE  + C  + E[DE, P, TM(C,  R)].  (7.3)
C E[DE,  P, TM(C,  R)]
TL
J f - T B ,  (7.4)
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points out in the context o f a review of several independent experiences in 
Latin America, ‘it [is] clear that the political will is the principal element for 
explaining differences in the performance o f property taxes’.
So far the discussion about the basic determ inants o f tax collections has 
not distinguished between the levels o f government responsible for collect­
ing the property tax. This distinction is im portant because different levels 
o f government are given different responsibilities and decision-making 
powers, and also because typically they possess dissimilar levels of adm in­
istrative capacity. In principle, the more discretion a subnational govern­
ment is allowed, the greater the influence it can exert on the variables 
determining the am ount of tax collections. In any case, equation (7.4) also 
shows that even with limited power over the design of the tax policy, a 
subnational government has a wide variety o f  channels available to alter 
the am ount o f tax collections. Indeed, due to their proximity to the collec­
tion process and to  the taxpayers, the subnational authorities could enjoy 
some advantages with respect to the central government. Corruption, for 
instance, might be easier to detect and correct at the local level; strength­
ening the enforcement o f the law and reducing tax evasion might well be 
facilitated by enhancing the taxpayers' participation in local expenditure 
decisions. Although not conclusive, the economic literature provides 
some evidence suggesting that fiscal decentralization reduces the level o f 
corruption in a country. When authorities enjoy a significant degree of 
autonom y they not only have more ability to  correct the distortions that 
reduce the level o f tax collections, but they also are more accountable to 
the com m unity.15
Comparing Tax Collection Performance at the Subnational Level
A subnational government responsible for collecting certain taxes would 
likely have some degree o f discretion over several, and maybe all, o f the 
explanatory variables described in equation (7.4). In this context, tax 
perform ance can be evaluated by com paring the am ount o f taxes col­
lected by different subnational governments under similar conditions. A 
good (poor) level o f perform ance would consist in collecting a relatively 
high (low) am ount o f  tax revenues with respect to o ther subnational 
governments that face a com parable tax base and enjoy a similar level o f 
discretion.
The natural question is what am ount o f tax collections should be 
considered as the benchm ark to distinguish between good and poor per­
formance. In principle, for each level o f government, the total am ount 
o f revenues raised should be able to cover all the expenditure needs. 
Therefore, in a decentralized system o f government the benchmarking
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am ount of tax collections can be defined, jointly for all tax instrum ents 
available, as the share o f expenditure needs that remain unfunded after 
the vertical imbalance has been corrected via intergovernm ental transfers. 
U nfortunately, this benchm ark requires a precise measure o f  the vertical 
imbalance, which in practice is difficult to  obtain. A more feasible alterna­
tive is to  set the benchmark at the average effective tax rate, te, such that 
any government whose effective tax rate is higher (lower) than the average 
would be said to exert a relatively high (low) ‘sta tu tory’ tax effort.16
Now we can multiply both the num erator and the denom inator of the 
right-hand side of equation (7.4) by f ,  and rewrite the equation to describe 
the tax collections o f  any jurisdiction i as:
f C, DE, E,[DE,,P,  TM,(C„ /? ,)]! /? -  
TC, -  {1  -  -= r  -  - = r  -  — —  ’ ' } =  • f  ■ TBt. (7.5) 
' I  TL, TL , TL, ) r
Note that P and r  are the only variables not determined inside the juris­
diction. In general, the tax law assigns different responsibilities to the 
different levels o f government, and  authority  over variables such as the 
penalties o f  tax evasion might be reserved to  the central government or 
even be an exclusive prerogative o f the congress. Because of this, the pen­
alties of tax evasion as well as any policy variables that are not under the 
authority  o f subnational governments can be considered to be determined 
exogenously.
On the right-hand side o f equation (7.5), the product o f the terms inside 
the bracket and the ratio o f adjusted statutory tax rate over the average 
(benchm ark) effective tax rate represents a ‘relative effective tax rate’, 
which takes a value greater than, equal to or lower than one as long as 
the tax rate effectively applied on the government unit / is greater than, 
equal to or lower than the sample average. This is precisely the definition 
o f what the economic literature refers to as the tax effort (TE) exerted by a 
particular government. M oreover, the product o f the last two terms in the 
equation, the average (benchm ark) effective tax rate times the tax base o f 
the government unit /, describes the concept o f  fiscal capacity (EC), which 
is usually defined as the am ount o f tax revenues that could be collected if a 
given level o f effort were applied to the available tax base. Equation (7.5) 
can therefore be reduced to  the following identity:
TC, = TE, ■ FC,y (7.6)
where the taxes collected by a governm ent i are defined as the am ount 
o f  revenues obtained by applying the level o f effort exerted by that 
government to a ‘fair’ measure o f  its potential tax revenues.
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By expressing the am ount o f tax collections as a function o f the level of 
tax effort, equation (7.6) stresses the fact that, given the size o f the avail­
able tax base, and a certain degree of fiscal autonom y, each subnational 
government is largely responsible for the am ount of taxes actually col­
lected within its jurisdiction. In this sense, tax effort is a choice variable 
that can be altered by voluntary decisions o f  subnational authorities and 
those o f  taxpayers, and therefore it can be used as a measure of tax col­
lection performance. Equation (7.6) implies that we can estimate the tax 
effort o f  a subnational government as the ratio of its actual tax collections 
over its fiscal capacity:
TC .
TE ; =  — 7. (7.7)
EC,
In order to evaluate the performance o f  each subnational government 
we only need to com pare its tax effort with the tax effort of the other 
subnational governm ents o f the same level. Moreover, since data about 
subnational revenue collections are usually available for most countries, 
the main challenge lies in estimating fiscal capacity.
A correct interpretation o f  the concept o f  tax effort requires a careful 
consideration of the actual degree o f fiscal autonom y enjoyed in each 
jurisdiction. If  all subnational governments enjoy the same degree of 
(significant) fiscal autonom y, then a relatively high (low) level o f fiscal 
effort might simply suggest that the jurisdiction’s residents are demanding 
a relatively large (small) am ount of subnational services. Given that the 
efficiency gains o f fiscal decentralization arise from tailoring the provision 
o f public services to  the needs and preferences of each community, then 
even a very low level o f  tax effort could be regarded as optimal. Indeed, 
if the system of intergovernm ental fiscal relations is properly functioning 
then there would be nothing right (wrong) with a high (low) level o f tax 
effort, and no reward (penalty) would be justified. In practice, however, 
and especially in the initial states o f a fiscal decentralization reform, sub­
national fiscal autonom y might be limited by several factors. For instance, 
there might not be a longstanding tradition of taxpayers' contributions 
to  the public sector, and thus taxpayers might not be willing to volun­
tarily comply with the law and nor would the tax authorities be willing 
to  enforce it. D ecentralization reform, in this sense, can actually imply 
a radical cultural change for some communities. A nother limitation, 
very common am ong poor jurisdictions, is that of the lack of technical 
and adm inistrative capacity to manage subnational finances and collect 
the taxes. A subnational government cannot be expected to assess the 
tax base, com pute the tax liability and collect the taxes w ithout proper 
means to carry out these functions. But this basic contradiction is a rather
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common occurrence am ong subnational governments in Latin America, 
especially in the rural areas. In order to address this problem either an 
asymmetric decentralization o f  public functions or central government 
assistance to develop adequate capacity would be required.
Given that the factors limiting subnational fiscal autonom y usually 
affect different jurisdictions unevenly, the observed variations in tax effort 
and perform ance may no longer be the result o f subnational choices. It 
follows that in order to m ake the subnational authorities (and the com ­
munities) fully liable for the differences in tax effort then they should enjoy 
equal, or at least com parable, levels o f  effective fiscal autonom y.
In spite o f this argum ent, in order to increase own-revenue collections, 
some countries decide to reward high tax effort with additional intergov­
ernmental transfers, and sanction low tax effort with no additional, or 
fewer, intergovernm ental transfers. These incentives might serve as an 
effective tool to encourage greater subnational tax collections, but it is 
im portant to recognize that they would plausibly lead to counterproduc­
tive results. The reason for this is very simple and deals with the trade-off 
faced at the subnational level between own-revenue sources and intergov­
ernmental transfers. Assuming tha t there are no savings, the to ta l am ount 
o f  government expenditures in public services (G) is equal to  own-tax 
collections plus the am ount received in the form of intergovernm ental 
transfers (T ),17 thus for any subnational government i  we can write the 
budget constraint as:
G, = TC, + T„ (7.8)
from which it is clear that subnational expenditures can be expressed as a 
function o f  intergovernm ental transfers, G, =  G,[T)]. Replacing T Q b y its  
definition in equation (7.6), dividing by fiscal capacity FCt and solving for 
the level o f  tax effort TE„ we find that:
G,[T] -  T
TE, =  - — FC  (7.9)
such that the tax effort exerted by the subnational government / is equal 
to the difference between the total am ount o f public expenditures and the 
intergovernm ental transfers received, over the fiscal capacity o f  the juris­
diction. In o ther words, tax effort corresponds to the extent to which a 
subnational government exhausts its own tax base.
According to equation (7.9) the direct effect of intergovernm ental 
transfers, with a negative sign, is to reduce tax effort. An additional effect, 
however, can be observed in the am ount o f public goods and  services
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provided. Considering fiscal capacity as exogenous, the net effect of trans­
fers on tax effort will depend on whether public expenditures will increase 
in a greater, equal or lower proportion than the transfers received. As a 
consequence, the final effect o f intergovernmental transfers on tax effort 
will ultimately depend on the elasticity o f public goods provision with 
respect to  a marginal increase o f the subnational budget. Jurisdictions 
where public goods are elastic will respond to additional intergovernmen­
tal transfers by increasing the level of tax effort, but those where public 
goods are inelastic, or comparatively less desirable, will reduce their 
tax effort.18 This implies that, regardless o f the level o f fiscal autonom y 
of subnational governments, tax effort can certainly be affected by 
intergovernmental transfers.
This analysis might suggest that the final effect o f intergovernmental 
transfers on tax effort is efficient in the sense that it responds to the demand 
of public services within each jurisdiction. However, this conclusion is not 
necessarily correct. The demand for public services is affected by prefer­
ences and also by the quality o f public services, and in turn this quality can 
be expected to vary across jurisdictions.19 Some local governments might 
not be able to provide public services with desirable standards o f quality, 
which would reduce their dem and and the resultant level o f  tax effort. The 
obvious equity problem s that arise will have to be solved in accordance 
with the national preferences for redistribution.
Estimating Fiscal Capacity of Subnational Governments
For the most part, the empirical literature on the property tax has focused 
on measuring tax effort at the subnational level by considering fiscal 
capacity as an exogenous factor with respect to the tax revenue perform ­
ance o f  subnational units. The reason for this is that any exercise of 
discretion implies a certain degree of responsibility and thus allows us to 
evaluate tax perform ance on the basis o f  effective power over tax collec­
tions. In this sense, subnational governments are by presumption passive 
with respect to their fiscal capacity and this concept can be regarded as 
irrelevant for perform ance evaluations.
In the previous discussion we showed, however, that a good measure 
o f  fiscal capacity is critical to accurately estimate the tax effort and evalu­
ate their tax perform ance. M easuring the fiscal capacity with respect to 
the property tax is particularly difficult because o f the great financial, 
technical and adm inistrative requirements for developing comprehensive 
cadastres of imm ovable properties. Any measure other than the cadas­
tre, and independent from the actual value of properties, will provide a 
questionable estim ation o f the potential property tax base.
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U nfortunately, developing countries struggle with the complexity and 
costs associated with the construction o f the cadastre, but still the prospect 
o f not taxing properties seems to be a much worse solution. In practice, 
the use o f  indirect methodologies for estimating the fiscal capacity associ­
ated with the property tax can help to partially solve this problem. The 
literature has described a num ber o f these methodologies, which have been 
designed to do as much as the availability o f inform ation allows.
One o f the simplest m ethodologies consists o f using historical p rop­
erty tax collections from one or several past periods. This methodology 
assumes that past collections can be representative o f the fiscal capacity 
o f local governments. However, there are several factors that might create 
a difference between potential and actual tax collections. The presence of 
centrally imposed exemptions eroding the tax base, or greater adm inistra­
tive and compliance costs, and the taxpayers’ willingness to contribute to 
the provision o f public goods, are some examples o f factors that might 
truly reduce fiscal disparities. But historically low tax collections might 
also be caused by inefficiency, political favors and corruption. In this 
context, it is desirable to have some inform ation about the determ inants 
o f fiscal capacity. For instance, we might expect that measures o f income, 
production or consum ption could be related to the size o f the tax base, 
including the property tax base. In general, the use o f this type o f ‘proxies’ 
is preferable to the use o f  historical data, but in developing countries we 
can rarely count on this inform ation at the local level.
There are several additional methodologies for estimating fiscal capac­
ity and their usefulness, o f  course, depends on whether the data  are avail­
able or no t.20 In any case, it is im portant to  stress the fact that deficient 
measures o f fiscal capacity lead, necessarily, to equally deficient estimates 
of tax effort.
Comparing Tax Collection Performance across Countries
The com parison of property tax perform ance across countries follows the 
same logic as the com parison o f subnational tax performance. Maybe the 
most im portant difference consists o f which institutions are ultimately 
responsible for the relative variations in tax performance. In the analysis 
o f subnational tax collections, subnational governments are responsible 
for their perform ance up to  the point where they do not have further dis­
cretion to affect tax collections. Such a limit is imposed, for instance, by the 
tax law, which can usually be regarded as exogenous for any subnational 
government and even for the central government. In contrast, regardless 
of which level o f government is responsible for administering a tax source, 
at the country level the tax law and the public policies in general should
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be considered as endogenous and other national institutions such as the 
congress and the judiciary system also become responsible for the result­
ant level o f  national tax performance.
In this cross-country context, most o f the variables determining prop­
erty tax collections can be considered to be endogenous, and we can define 
the total am ount o f  tax collections for any country j  as:
f  DEj Cj Ej[DEj, Pj, TMj(.Cp R )  J I
T C ,=  < \ -------------- — - - - - -  } t° ■ TB„ (7.10)
'  i  TLj TLj TLt J ‘ '
where besides the change in subscripts the only difference with respect to 
the subnational case is that the penalties for tax evasion (as well as any 
other determ inant that might be exogenously imposed by the tax law) are 
expressed as endogenous (choice) variables.21
Moreover, given that a country has full discretion to define the tax base, 
and provided that the m arket value of all land and structures ( Vt)  is avail­
able for taxation in the national territory, then the share o f the actual tax 
base over Vj becomes by itself a com ponent o f  the national tax effort. As a 
consequence, the country has discretion over all the variables in the right- 
hand side of the equation, and tax effort can be defined simply as:
TC,
TEj — (7.11)
j
This equation states that national tax effort can be estimated as the ratio 
between actual tax collections and the m arket value o f lands and structures 
available for taxation within a country, while the last term determines the 
potential tax collections or fiscal capacity o f  the country. In turn, cross­
country com parisons can be carried out by simply com paring the values 
o f national tax effort.
O f course, as in the case of subnational tax performance, the main chal­
lenge with estim ating national tax effort is measuring the fiscal capacity of 
the country. If this is possible, however, the cross-country analysis of tax 
effort and perform ance offers im portant advantages in terms o f data avail­
ability, because much m ore data about institutional, political, cultural and 
economic variables are available at the country level.
Given that each country defines its own property tax base and might 
use different valuation methods to estimate the tax base, a wide variation 
o f financial and technical arrangem ents can be observed am ong different 
countries. As a consequence, even if available, national estimates of the 
property tax base are not comparable. Bahl and Wallace (2010) suggest 
a standardized approach in order to solve this problem: The measures of
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national wealth provided by the W orld Bank (2006) can be used to esti­
m ate the size o f  the potential property tax base under a single criterion 
and for a large number o f countries. In Appendix Table 7A.2 we present 
the estimates o f  the potential property tax bases for a num ber of Latin 
American countries. U nfortunately, the measures o f national wealth are 
currently available only for the year 2000; thus even if useful, they do not 
provide inform ation about how tax bases vary across time. In the next 
section we use these estimates in the econometric analysis o f international 
property tax performance.
5 THE D ETER M IN A NTS OF PROPERTY TAX  
COLLECTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
An empirical test o f  the main propositions o f our analysis requires infor­
m ation that, in general, is not available at the subnational level in Latin 
American countries, so we are not able to  properly account for the deter­
minants o f  property tax collections at the w ithin-country level. For this 
reason, we begin with a simple OLS regression analysis in order to verify 
how intergovernm ental transfers received by local governm ents in Brazil 
and Peru (in national currency) are correlated with per capita property tax 
collections.22
The results are presented in Table 7.4. Because o f  data availability, 
we are able to include only a few other control variables to get a clearer 
picture o f  the potential impact o f  intergovernm ental transfers on property 
tax collections. These control variables are the total am ount o f  current 
revenues in each jurisdiction, revenue autonom y (defined as own taxes 
over total revenues), population, regional G D P in the case o f  Brazil, and 
the relative incidence o f poverty and the percent o f urban population in 
the case o f  Peru. We should also note that total current revenues and 
revenue autonom y should be expected to be endogenous with property 
tax collections; however, lacking valid instrum ents we cannot correct this 
problem. Nevertheless, a few interesting observations may be drawn from 
the results.
The most relevant result in Table 7.4 is that current intergovernmental 
transfers per capita are negatively and significantly correlated with prop­
erty tax collections per capita in the two countries. This would seem to 
suggest that on average current transfers act as a disincentive for property 
tax collections. However, we need to  interpret this result with caution. 
There may be an endogeneity bias in these estimates because lower prop­
erty tax revenues per capita may also induce larger current intergovern­
mental transfers per capita. On the o ther hand, the coefficients o f capital
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Table 7.4 Determinants o f  property tax collections in Brazil and Peru 
( dependent variable: per capita property tax collections)
OLS regression: Brazil OLS regression: Peru
Current transfers per capita -0.1124*** -0.2263***
(0.0237) (0.0130)
Capital transfers per capita 0.0058 -0.0080
(0.0063) (0.0191)
Current revenues per capita 0.1081*** 0.2165***
(0.0223) (0.0123)
Revenue autonomy (%) 2.5051*** 1.6772***
(64.9611) (49.8014)
Per capita GDP (2000) -0.0006**
(0.0003)
Poverty 0.0097
(0.0427)
Urban population (%) -0.1065***
(0.0390)
Population (thousands) -0.0015 -0.1159***
(0.0047) (0.0439)
Constant -8.7593*** 6.6278
(3.3112) (4.0486)
Observations 4,998 1.428
^-squared 0.5218 0.8769
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
intergovernm ental transfers are not statistically significant, suggesting 
that the distribution o f  this revenue source because o f its unpredictability 
or periodicity does not affect local property tax collection performance.
The coefficients o f total current revenues and revenue autonom y are 
positive and statistically significant. But these results are expected due to 
the construction o f  those variables; by definition the larger the property 
tax collections the larger will be the am ount o f current revenues as well as 
the share o f own revenues in the local budgets. However, they might also 
suggest, subject again to a possible endogeneity bias, that local govern­
ments with larger budgets and more revenue autonom y might be better 
able to  collect property taxes.
The regressions also include proxies for local fiscal capacity, which help 
to estim ate the relative size o f the property tax base as well as the adm in­
istrative capacity o f  local governments. The per capita G D P variable is
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available for Brazilian local governments. Its coefficient is negative and 
significant at the 5 percent confidence level. This result is contrary to our 
expectations, as long as G D P  per capita is expected to be highly correlated 
with the property tax base; but it could also be that a higher G D P per 
capita signals the availability o f o ther tax bases, such as Brazil’s ISS (local 
tax on services), which is relatively more im portant than the property tax 
in local budgets. The availability o f o ther tax sources may push down 
local efforts to collect the more difficult and unpopular property tax.23 
However, we must note that the estim ated coefficient is relatively unim­
portant in terms o f magnitude, implying that property tax collections are 
not that responsive to this factor. In the case o f  Peru there are no measures 
o f G D P  at the local level. Instead, we use a measure of poverty defined as 
the share o f the population under the poverty line; this variable displays 
no significant correlation with property taxes. In addition, we consider 
the share o f the population living in urban areas, which is expected to be 
directly related with the size o f the property tax base; however, here again 
the coefficient is instead negative and statistically significant, perhaps sign­
aling the availability o f other m ore ‘convenient’ revenue sources in urban 
areas.
Finally, the regressions also include population as a contro l for the 
jurisdiction size. In both cases the coefficient is negative, but it is sig­
nificant only for Peruvian municipalities. This is somewhat surprising 
because we would expect to observe economies o f scale in property tax 
collections. However, this result might be explained, for instance, by the 
presence o f  economies o f scale on the expenditure side; or, alternatively, 
by a positive correlation between the extent o f informal properties and the 
jurisdictional size.
The empirical analysis o f property tax collections at the local level is still 
subject to  very im portant data lim itations, and the inability to  properly 
control for other determ inants can easily lead to significant om itted vari­
able bias. In contrast, even though at the international level the data are 
also limited, there are several additional variables that allow us to control 
for macroeconomic, political and institutional factors that are relevant in 
determ ining property tax collections. In the end, however, there is a clear 
trade-off since using international cross-country data is also subject to 
aggregation biases and om itted country fixed effects.
The cross-country analysis o f  the determ inants o f  property tax collec­
tions considers nine Latin American countries for which relevant data are 
partially available for the 1990-2007 period: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colom bia. Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru. The dependent 
variable, property tax collections, is defined as the share o f property tax 
collections in G D P. Based on the discussion in the previous section, we
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expect property tax collections to decrease with deficient enforcement, 
corruption, tax evasion and the predom inance of transfers, and to increase 
with the size o f the property tax base, government responsiveness, and the 
average tax rate. Even though there are direct measures o f all these vari­
ables, some of them are not available for long periods o f time for all Latin 
American countries. In order to maximize the number o f observations, 
we use alternative (more common) variables as proxies o f our variables of 
interest.
We consider a variety o f factors accounting for the design o f fiscal 
arrangem ents, the level o f  development, the size o f the property tax base, 
relevant differences in the implementation o f  the property tax, and basic 
characteristics o f the political system.24 The structure o f fiscal arrange­
ments is described through measures of fiscal decentralization, the level o f 
transfer dependency, and the size o f government. Fiscal decentralization 
is defined as the share o f  subnational expenditures over total government 
expenditures, and it is used to represent the extent o f the fiscal devolution 
to the subnational governm ents.25 The dependency on transfers is defined 
as the share of intergovernm ental transfers in total subnational revenues. 
As explained, intergovernmental transfers reduce the need for collecting 
own revenues and, therefore, might reduce tax effort and the collections 
of the property tax. Finally, government size is used to account for the 
relative magnitude and relevancy of the public sector and its components, 
including transfer program s, in the overall economy.
The level o f development is represented by the per capita GDP. This 
variable provides inform ation, among other things, on the levels o f accu­
m ulated physical and hum an capital. For example, local governments in 
richer countries might have access to highly skilled personnel and more 
sophisticated equipm ent, so that their ability to adm inister and collect 
taxes is greater than that o f less-developed countries. However, different 
levels o f  development can also be related to diverse patterns o f subnational 
governm ents’ financing, and thus the sign o f the influence on property tax 
collections remains uncertain.
Property tax collections also depend on the value o f  land and struc­
tures in a country, which accounts for the potential property tax base. 
We approxim ate this value, following Bahl and Wallace (2010), with 
estim ations com puted on the basis o f national wealth data  provided by 
the W orld Bank (2006) (see Appendix Table 7A.2). We also control for 
the share o f the urban population, because the size and composition o f the 
tax base as well as the am ount of property tax collections can be expected 
to be quite different in rural and urban areas. In addition, we include two 
dummy variables to  control for the specific characteristics o f Chile, where 
the adm inistration and the authority over the property tax remain fully
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centralized, and of Ecuador and Mexico, the only countries in the sample 
where the cadastre is developed by the subnational governments (see 
Appendix Table 7A.1).
In practice, subnational governments can effectively enjoy additional 
fiscal autonom y only if the decentralization process also enhances the 
political representation o f  the population. Indeed, the share o f local gov­
ernment expenditure over total government expenditures does not say 
much about the ability o f  taxpayers to  choose their representatives and 
express their preferences for public goods, which, in turn, determines the 
extent o f effective accountability of government officials and the degree 
o f responsiveness to taxpayers’ preferences. In order to account for these 
factors we consider two variables: the com petition for public positions and 
an index o f democracy. The degree o f com petition for public positions, 
we argue, serves to limit the ability o f  local authorities to take advantage 
of their political power, and thus helps to  increase accountability and to 
contain corruption. Com plem entarily, the index o f democracy serves to 
represent the ability o f  taxpayers to truly express their preferences.
Table 7.5 presents the results o f our empirical analysis. The first regres­
sion (1) uses a fixed effects model in order to control in the estim ation for 
all unobserved specific-country characteristics. As we might expect, the 
coefficient o f  fiscal decentralization is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level. A greater devolution o f expenditure responsibilities 
to subnational governments requires relatively more revenues, provid­
ing incentives for greater property tax collections. The coefficient for 
the dependency on transfers takes a negative sign, and thus is negatively 
related to  property tax collections, and it is statistically significant a t the 
5 percent level. This result is im portant because it supports our conjecture 
that the predom inance o f transfers can have a negative effect on tax effort. 
In order to control for the relative m agnitude o f intergovernm ental trans­
fers we also include an interaction term between transfers and the size of 
the (general) government with respect to  the G DP. The coefficient of this 
variable is positive and significant, suggesting that the negative effect of 
transfers o f property tax collections is reduced as the size o f  the govern­
ment increases. A bigger public sector might need to count on other (than 
property) tax sources, and might also be better able to  improve tax adm in­
istration at every level and to implement ‘non-distorting’ or ‘incentive- 
neutral’ transfer program s. On average, the net effect o f transfers on 
property tax collections becomes positive when the size o f the public sector 
corresponds to 17.7 percent o f the econom y (displayed at the bottom  of 
Table 7.5).
The level o f development, represented by the G D P per capita, has a neg­
ative effect on property tax collections, which is significant at the 1 percent
Table 7.5 Determinants o f  property tax collections ( dependent variable: property tax collections ( PT C)  as a share o f  
GDP)
Fixed effects Random effects Random effects Random effects I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fiscal decentralization (%) 0.00919*** 0.01617*** 0.01445*** 0.03038***
(0.00242) (0.00150) (0.00135) (0.00637)
Dependency on transfers (%) -0.01047** -0.01053*** -0.00502** -0.02031***
(0.00509) (0.00234) (0.00255) (0.00697)
Interaction term (dep. on transfers x 0.00059** 0.00072*** 0.00043*** 0.00086***
government size) (0.00028) (0.00014) (0 00015) (0.00029)
Government size (% GDP) -0.01288 -0.02731*** -0.00776 -0.04679**
(0.01554) (0.00901) (0.00952) (0.01991)
Log o f  per capita G DP -0.17295*** -0.28330*** -2.65021*** 0.10259
(0.04730) (0.05883) (0.84908) (0.11616)
Log o f  per capita G D P squared 0.12901***
(0.04562)
Log o f  estimated property tax base 0.27237*** 0.26629*** 0.40590***
(as computed in Appendix Table 7A.2) (0.02755) (0.02683) (0.08117)
Urban population (%) 0.00438 -0.01564*** -0.01050*** -0.04710***
(0.00743) (0.00280) (0.00326) (0.01429)
Municipal cadastre (dummy) -0.35632*** -0.36153*** -0.33473***
(0.02223) (0.02096) (0.05178)
Chile (dummy) 0.85010*** 0.83174*** 1.17456***
(0.05660) (0.05267) (0.16223)
Competition for public positions 0.09501*** 0.12712*** 0.12667*** 0.14642***
(0.02422) (0.02600) (0.02439) (0.04218)
Table 7.5  (con tinued)
Fixed effects 
(1)
Random effects 
(2)
Random effects 
(3)
Random effects IVa 
(4)
Index o f  democracy -0.03259*** -0.05281*** -0.05330*** 0.08504***
(0.00727) (0.00804) (0.00702) (0.01904)
Constant 1.68607*** 3.53144*** 13.66880*** 4.51384***
(0.63587) (0.45747) (3.72743) (0.74078)
Observations 115 115 115 115
Number o f  countries 9 9 9 9
/?-squared within 0.5913 0.4667 0.4487 0.1603
/f-squared between 0.1392 0.9795 0.9921 0.9252
/^-squared overall 0.1288 0.9332 0.9396 0.8367
Test o f  overidentifying restrictions 0.233
p -value 0.6294
The mg. effect o f  G D P on PTC turns positive 28,892
when G D P per capita is:
The mg. effect o f  transfers on PTC turns 17.7 14.6 11.7 23.6
positive when government size is:
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include time period dummies (not shown)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
a The instrumented variables are fiscal decentralization, dependency on transfers, and the interaction term between the later and government size. 
The instruments are log o f population, political competition, openness to international trade and the price level o f government expenditures.
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level. This result might appear as counterintuitive, because a greater level 
o f development is usually associated not only with improved tax bases and 
adm inistrative and tax collection capacity, but also with greater ability 
(and maybe willingness) to  pay property taxes. An alternative explanation 
o f this result would go along the same lines discussed above for the case 
of Brazil; higher G D P  per capita may signal the availability o f other tax 
sources o f  some significance and therefore a relative decrease in the reli­
ance on property taxes as a source o f local revenue. A simple analysis o f 
the subnational tax mix and G D P per capita would seem to point in that 
direction; Figure 7.1(a) plots property tax collections as a share of subna­
tional taxes against G D P  per capita. There appears to  be a clear negative 
relationship between these variables, suggesting that the relative im por­
tance o f the property in subnational governm ents’ financing decreases as 
the country G D P per capita increases.26
Finally, among the other controls only competition for public posi­
tions and the index o f  democracy are statistically significant. As expected, 
the variable used to represent accountability and the limits to corruption 
-  com petition for public positions, is positively related to property tax 
collections. In contrast, the coefficient o f the index of democracy has a 
negative sign, suggesting that the property tax might not enjoy political 
acceptability.27
The second column o f Table 7.5 presents the results o f a random  effects 
model in which we are able to include time-constant variables, at the same 
time partially controlling for country-specific effects. The results under 
this specification are fairly consistent with the findings under fixed effects, 
but all controls are now significant at the 1 percent level. In particular, 
government size and the percentage o f urban population appear to be 
negatively correlated with property tax collections.
The time-invariant variables that are included in this estimation are 
(the logarithm of) the estimated size of the potential tax base, a dummy 
that takes the value o f one for Chile, and a dummy that assigns a value of 
one to  the two countries of the sample in which the cadastre is developed 
locally, Ecuador and Mexico. The signs o f the coefficients o f  the time- 
constant variables are in line with our expectations. The greater the size 
of the potential tax base the greater the relative am ount o f  property tax 
collections.28 On the o ther hand, Ecuador and Mexico appear as collecting 
fewer taxes due to the reliance on, presum ably ill-equipped, subnational 
tax adm inistration; Chile performs better than the average o f the sample 
due to the opposite reason.
Regression (3) in Table 7.5 introduces the square of the G D P  per capita 
in order to allow for a non-linear influence on property tax collections. 
The general results do not significantly differ from the previous regression.
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Figure 7.1 Relationship of property tax  collections with GDP per capita 
and corruption
Explaining property tax collections in developing countries 205
and the square o f the G D P  per capita is positive and statistically signifi­
cant at the 1 percent level; implying that the negative m arginal effect o f 
development on property tax collection decreases with per capita G D P.29
A relevant concern about the econometric specification is the existence 
o f an endogenous relationship between some o f the explanatory variables 
and property tax collections. In particular we may expect a certain degree 
o f reverse causality; tha t is, we can expect the extent o f fiscal decentraliza­
tion and the am ount o f  transfers to be influenced by the level o f  property 
tax collections. In order to  address this problem, in regression (4) we use 
a generalized two-stage least squares (G2SLS) random  effects model, 
where we introduce instrum ental variables (IV) to correct possible biases 
in the estimators. The instrumented variables are fiscal decentralization, 
dependency on transfers, and the interaction term between dependency 
on transfers and the size of government. As instruments we choose the 
log o f  population, the degree o f political (party) com petition, openness 
to international trade and the price level o f government expenditures.10 
The set o f  instrum ents is highly correlated with the three endogenous vari­
ables but uncorrelated with property tax collections. M oreover, the test 
of overidentifying restrictions (in the table) fails to reject the null that the 
set o f excluded variables are valid instruments.-11 In general, although the 
m agnitude o f the coefficients exhibit relevant corrections, their signs and 
statistical significance remain roughly unaffected.52
Summarizing, property tax revenue performance improves with the 
extent o f  fiscal decentralization, the presence of accountability m echa­
nisms, and the size o f  the potential tax base. In contrast, tax collections 
decrease with the index o f democracy, higher dependency on transfers, 
and the fact that the cadastre is administered locally.
Finally, a variable that we have considered as a potentially im portant 
determ inant o f property tax collections is the perception o f corruption, 
which even if available, has been excluded from the econometric analysis 
due to the small num ber o f observations. Figure 7.1(b) presents a scatter 
plot where we verify an apparent correlation between property tax col­
lections as a share o f G D P and the C orruption Perceptions Index. The 
C orruption Perceptions Index assigns a greater value to those countries 
that are less corrupt, thus the positively sloped trend line suggests that less 
corrupt countries are, on average, able to  collect more property taxes.33
This analysis provides im portant insights about the determ inants of 
property  tax collections in Latin America. In principle, given that we 
do not have inform ation about what the 'correct' level o f property tax 
collections is, we canno t say a priori w hether increasing tax collections 
is a desirable thing. However, it is well known that Latin American 
countries perform  below international standards, and since we have no
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reason to presum e that their subnational expenditure needs are par­
ticularly low, then we can conclude that certain  factors have an  exces­
sively (undesirable) negative influence on property  tax collections. The 
dependency on transfers and local responsibility for the im plem entation 
o f the cadastre are two relevant factors in reducing property tax collec­
tions and over which the au thorities m ight have some degree o f  control. 
F o r instance, the design o f  the fiscal decentralization might incorporate 
new subnational own-revenue sources, such tha t the local authorities 
and their constituencies internalize the value o f revenue autonom y and 
start exercising higher tax effort in order to  finance expanded local 
services. Nevertheless, greater autonom y at the local level does not 
mean tha t complex, long-lasting and expensive tasks such as building 
a com plete cadastre o f  properties can be undertaken w ithout assistance 
from  the central governm ent. The movem ent tow ards greater revenue 
collections and  autonom y, especially in developing countries, must be 
gradual, with a central governm ent that is able to  support and  assist 
local adm inistrations in their transition  to  m ore decentralized and 
efficient arrangem ents.
6 CONCLUSIONS A N D  POLICY 
RECO M M EN D ATION S
Successful decentralization in terms o f efficiency and fiscal responsibil­
ity depends critically on the provision o f adequate revenue autonom y to 
subnational governments. The property tax is widely considered as the 
most appropriate instrument to prom ote tax autonom y at the local level, 
while other taxes such as vehicle taxes, local excise, piggyback personal 
income taxes, or business perm it taxes should also play an im portant role 
in the prom otion o f local tax autonom y. However, it is difficult to argue 
strongly for greater property tax autonom y when many local governments 
in Latin America appear not to  be taking advantage o f the autonom y 
that is currently granted in the laws. An im portant piece o f  any potential 
indictment is that, judging from what is collected in other regions o f the 
world, actual property tax collections in the region are a small fraction of 
what appears to be the revenue potential. In this context, any attem pts 
to  achieve more efficient forms o f decentralization in the Latin American 
region via increased revenue autonom y for local governments would need 
to grapple with the question o f  how to achieve significant improvement in 
local property tax collections.
Property tax collections are determ ined by a wide array o f factors. These 
factors include, am ong others, the extent or depth o f  fiscal decentralization
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reforms, the structure o f subnational financing, the level o f  development, 
the potential size o f  the property tax base, and basic institutional charac­
teristics o f  the public sector. In particular, we find that the predominance 
of intergovernm ental transfers in the subnational finance systems have 
a negative effect on property tax collections and that, for the most part, 
subnational governments are unwilling or do not seem capable of taking 
advantage of the devolution o f this revenue source. In this context, getting 
the property tax to perform  correctly may take more than just addressing 
the issues, complex on their own, o f designing, administering and enforc­
ing the property tax itself. For instance, we argue that government respon­
siveness towards taxpayers’ needs and improvements in cultural factors 
such as tax morale m ight be necessary to increase property tax collections.
Effective devolution o f the property tax to subnational governments 
should be accompanied by certain preconditions. Some o f these precondi­
tions are not currently met by some Latin American countries, and thus 
provide a good starting point to draw meaningful policy recom m enda­
tions to guide future reforms. O f course, country circumstances and con­
ditions differ, so not all recommendations should be expected to apply to 
each case.
There is a clear need for most local governments to develop their adm in­
istrative and technical capacities. This rather obvious recom m endation 
has long been recognized in the literature, but it remains as an unavoidable 
and pending task. Two possible strategies to move forward in this regard 
are the implementation of asymmetric property tax assignments and the 
provision o f technical and financial assistance to those local governments 
with lower adm inistrative capacity. M oreover, improving the performance 
o f the property tax in the region would also benefit from strengthening 
institutions and reshaping cultural attitudes. In particular, it is necessary 
to m ake local authorities understand the im portance o f own-tax revenues 
and to show taxpayers the connection between property tax payments 
and local services. This will not be an easy task, but successful experiences 
such as those provided by the cities o f Bogota and Lima might serve as 
relevant examples (see M artinez-Vazquez, 2010). Finally, some reforms to 
the intergovernm ental finance system may be necessary. It is particularly 
im portant to correct the incentives provided by the system of transfers. 
In this chapter we provide some evidence o f  a potential negative effect o f 
intergovernmental transfers on property tax collections. These issues still 
need to  be carefully investigated.
Overall, and somewhat paradoxically, greater revenue autonom y for 
Latin American local governments in the form of a more effective use of 
the property tax might depend in some cases on a deeper involvement of 
the central government in the adm inistration, collection and enforcement
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o f the property tax. M aking property taxes work more effectively will 
continue to  be a complex challenge and no simple ‘silver bullet’ simple 
solutions are in sight. A ttention must be given to ‘internal’ factors, includ­
ing issues o f adm inistration and local capacity, but equal attention must 
also be given to an array o f  factors that are ‘external’ to the property tax 
collection process itself.
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1. The taxation o f property comes in many different modalities and within each one of 
them different approaches have been used in the international practice, all o f which 
offer different advantages and disadvantages. Many o f these are reviewed in Bird and 
Slack (2004) and Bahl et al. (2008a, 2010).
2. For a detailed description of property tax systems in Latin America, see De Cesare and 
Lazo Marin (2008).
3. The advantages o f the property tax as a local tax arc reviewed, among many others, in 
Oates (1999), Bird (2006), and Bahl et al. (2008b).
4. The concept o f equity in the distribution o f income ultimately deals with who bears the 
burden of the tax, or the incidence o f  the tax. Zodrow (2007) provides a brief review of 
the property tax incidence literature.
5. Based on an empirical analysis encompassing 34 developing countries and 22 developed 
countries, Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) suggest that the local governments 
might actually contribute to improving the distribution o f income. However, this con­
clusion is subject to a public sector playing a significant role in the economy (more than 
20% of the GDP), a condition that is not observed in Latin American countries, where 
total expenditures o f the general government represent, on average during 2007, less 
than 15% o f  the G D P (Penn World Table, Heston e ta l., 2009).
6. Discussions about the property tax and the characteristics of a good local tax 
are discussed, for instance, in McLure (1994), McCluskey and Williams (1999), 
McCluskey and Plimmer (2007), Bahl and Bird (2008) and Martinez-Vazquez et al. 
(2010).
7. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) suggest that tax competition has a corrective effect on 
the overall amount o f public expenditures, because it limits the natural tendency of 
governments to spend more than the efficient amount.
8. Oates (2006) provides a more recent discussion about the decentralization theorem 
and the channels through which fiscal decentralization can lead to net welfare gains for 
society.
9. See Shah (2004) for a discussion about the possible factors explaining the widespread 
decentralization movement among developing and transition countries.
10. In the equality provided by Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008) both sides o f the iden­
tity are divided by the GDP. By doing this, the tax collections are expressed in relative 
terms, thus the figures for different countries arc comparable and the analysis can 
be carried out on a cross-sectional basis. This equality was previously presented, for 
instance, in Bahl (1979).
11. If the collection ratio is assumed to be set at 1 by the tax authorities, then this term 
might still have a value different from one, which could be interpreted as a devia­
tion of the "true’ market value o f taxable properties due to an inaccurate assessment 
o f  the value o f taxable properties. In this framework, however, we assume that the
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market value is correctly measured and that the collection ratio serves only as a policy 
instrument.
12. The literature reserves the term ‘tax avoidance’ to refer to any legal form of non­
compliance. Tax avoidance corresponds to the taxpayers' initiatives to minimize their 
tax burden by taking advantage of preferential treatments and exemptions contem­
plated in the law. In this model, tax avoidance is accounted for as a reduction of taxable 
market value o f properties, and thus a reduction of the property tax base.
13. The basic structure o f  the traditional tax evasion model is developed by Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973), and the cost o f enforcement is incorporated by 
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987). Two surveys on the theory of tax compliance are pro­
vided by Andreoni et al. (1998) and Sandmo (2005).
14. A comprehensive review o f the concept o f tax morale and the relevant literature is pro­
vided by Torgler (2007).
15. See, for instance, Fisman and Gatti (2002) for an empirical analysis providing strong 
support to the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization reduces corruption.
16. f  can be computed as the total amount o f taxes actually collected among all govern­
ment units divided by the overall tax base. This definition corresponds to the weighted 
average of the effective tax rate for all government units. A different alternative, not 
less convenient, consists in computing the benchmark as the simple average of the effec­
tive tax rates for the available sample (of countries or subnational governments). The 
weighted average will be expected to be greater (smaller) than the simple average as long 
as per capita collections tend to increase (decrease) with the jurisdiction size.
17. Other sources o f own-revenue collections (for example, fees and financial debt) are 
excluded, without loss o f generality, in order to simplify the analysis. Here we also dis­
regard whether the intergovernmental transfers are earmarked or not, but this docs not 
alter the fact that any degree of discretion over own-revenue collections translates into 
discretion ‘in the margin’ over the total amount of government expenditures.
18. As a corollary o f this result we could say that if intergovernmental transfers increase, 
do not change, or decrease tax effort in a jurisdiction, then the demand for public goods 
within that jurisdiction has been revealed to be elastic, have unitary elasticity, or be 
inelastic.
19. Equation (7.8) corresponds to a strictly budgetary identity, but it can be modified in 
order to model the supply and demand for subnational public goods and services. The 
left-hand side would have to incorporate a production function describing the amount 
and quality of public goods and services, and in the right-hand side the tax collections 
would represent the willingness to pay for these outputs.
20. For a review and an extensive discussion about the alternative methodologies available 
to measure fiscal capacity see. for instance, US ACIR (1986) and Boex and Martinez- 
Vazquez (2007).
21. One might argue that foreign tax policies also affect tax collections because they can 
induce the taxpayers to emigrate in order to capitalize on tax advantages. This is espe­
cially relevant in cases where taxpayers are very mobile, as in corporations. In any case, 
mobility is fully accounted for in this equation by a decrease in the size o f the tax base. 
Another way in which foreign tax policies may also affect tax collections is through 
spatial tax competition across countries. In this case tax rates and other policies set in 
foreign countries can affect the tax policy choice in any one country.
22. The choice o f these countries responds to data availability. Both Brazil and Peru 
provide public information about subnational finances and basic demographic and 
development indicators. The main data sources are the National Treasury of Brazil and 
the Ministry o f Economy and Finance of Peru.
23. A similar result is found in the analysis of property tax collections at the international 
level, which is presented later in this section, and where we discuss possible interpreta­
tions in more detail.
24. The description and sources of the variables used in the analysis, as well as the summary 
statistics, are presented in Appendix Tables 7A.3 and 7A.4, respectively.
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25. Even though this variable does not capture the effective autonomy of subnational 
government, lacking any better option we follow the most common practice in 
the decentralization literature and use this variable to proxy for the level of fiscal 
decentralization.
26. The data for Chile, within the oval in Figure 7 .1(a), exhibit a distinctive pattern, which 
has been accounted for by the country dummy in the econometric specification.
27. In order to account for additional country-specific characteristics we also considered 
regional disparities in G D P per capita as an additional control variable. The correla­
tion between this variable and property tax collections as a share o f G D P is -0.686, 
suggesting that countries with greater regional disparities tend to collect fewer property 
taxes. However, we do not present the results for this variable because its inclusion in 
the estimating equations drastically reduces the number o f observations.
28. The explicit consideration of the potential tax base might also help to explain the nega­
tive sign of the urban population’s coefficient. Once the size o f the tax base has been 
accounted for, a negative relationship between urban population and property tax 
collections might suggest that urban areas have a greater concentration of unregistered 
properties and exempted taxpayers than is the case in rural areas.
29. The average effect o f development on property tax collections turns out to be positive 
when the GDP per capita is US$28,892. That point, however, is irrelevant because no 
country in the sample reaches that value.
30. Sec Appendix Tables 7A.3 and 7A.4 for a description of the variables used and 
summary statistics.
3 1. The test o f  ovcridentifying restrictions was developed for Stata by Schaffer and Stillman 
(2006).
32. The only exception is the level o f development, which turns out to be statistically insig­
nificant. We cannot know, however, if this change is due to the correction of a bias 
or due to possible collinearity introduced by the instrumentation for the endogenous 
variables.
33. The Corruption Perceptions Index is prepared by Transparency International, 
and the data can be retrieved from http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/ 
surveys_indices/cpi.
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APPENDIX 7A
Table 7 A. 1 Main characteristics o f  property tax  system s in Latin America
Country Revenue
assignment
Authority to change 
the tax structure
Administration
Cadastre Billing and 
collection
Appeals Assessment
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Provincial and Provincial and local 
local govts governments
Municipal
governments
Central (rural) 
and municipal 
(urban) govts 
Municipal 
governments
Central govt 
(Ministerio de 
Finanzas) along with 
municipal governments 
Central and municipal 
governments
Central government
Cadastral office
Direccion Nacional de 
Catastro Urbano
Central (rural) and 
municipal (urban) govts
Servicios de Impuestos 
Internos (SII)
Provincial 
and local 
governments
Municipal
governments
Municipal
governments
Central
government
(Treasury)
Formal appeal 
processes 
at both 
government 
levels
Internal Tax 
Service, Special 
Appeals Court 
on Property 
Valuation, 
Supreme Court
Market value
Market value
Market value
Area by 
location 
for land, 
construction 
value for 
buildings
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Guatemala
Municipal
governments
Municipal
governments
Municipal
governments
Central and
municipal
governments
National Congress 
defines tax base and 
rate. A range o f rates 
is established within 
which municips are 
free to choose
Central govt along 
with municipalities' 
ability to set rates 
Central and municipal 
governments
Honduras Municipal Municipal
governments governments
Instituto Geografico 
Agustin Codazzi 
(IGAC)
Municipal governments 
(Catastro Nacional)
Municipal governments
Central government 
(Direccion General de 
Catastro)
Municipal governments
Municipal Cadastral Market value
governments Division,
(Secretarias petition tax
de Hacienda) administration
Municipal Market value
governments
Municipal . Market value
governments
Mainly Market value
central govt.
except for
municipalities
with
technical and
administrative
capacity
Municipal Market
governments value, use
o f the land,
location and
improvements
Table 7A. 1 (continued)
Country Revenue
assignment
Authority to change 
the tax structure
Administration
Cadastre Billing and 
collection
Appeals Assessment
Mexico
Panama
Paraguay
Municipal
governments
Nicaragua Municipal
governments
Central
government
Municipal
governments
and
departments
State and municipal 
governments jointly
Central government 
with municipalities’ 
ability to grant 
additional exemptions 
Central and provincial 
governments 
Central government 
(Ministerio de 
Finanzas Publicas)
Municipal governments
Comision Nacional de 
Catastro
Central government
Mainly central govt, 
except for those 
municips with technical 
and adm. capacity
Local
governments
(local
Treasury
offices)
Municipal
governments
Provincial
governments
Municipal
governments
Fiscal 
authority 
judicial branch
Market value
Cadastral
value
Market value
Peru
Dominican
Republic
Uruguay
Venezuela
Municipal 
and district 
governments 
Central 
government
Departments
Central, municipal and 
district governments
Central government
Central and municipal 
government, along 
with departments
Municipal Municipal 
governments governments
Central government 
(Comision Nacional de 
Tasaciones: CONATA) 
Central government 
(Direccion General del 
Catastro Nacional)
Central govt (rural; 
Direccion Nacional 
de Catastro) and 
departments (urban)
Municipal governments
Municipal 
and district 
governments 
Central 
government
Departments
Municipal
governments
Market value
Value
greater than 
approximately 
US$150,000 
Market value 
plus additional 
20% for 
improvements 
the rural cases 
Market value
Source: Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2010).
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Table 7 A .2 Estimates o f  potential property tax base by country anti 
region, 2000 ( in USS per capita)
Region Country Potential rural tax base Potential 
urban tax 
base 
Urban 
land + 
structures*
Potential 
base of 
the 
property 
tax
Cropland Pasture-
land
Cropland + 
pasture- 
land
SA
Latin America 
Argentina 3,632 2,754 6,386 18,301 24,687
CA Belize 5,201 133 5,334 9,298 14,632
SA Bolivia 1,550 541 2,091 2,021 4,112
SA
(Plurinational 
State of) 
Brazil 1,998 1,311 3,309 9,234 12,543
SA Chile 2,443 1,001 3,444 10,235 13,679
SA Colombia 1,911 978 2,889 4,665 7,554
CA Costa Rica 5,811 1,310 7,121 7,989 15,110
SA Ecuador 5,263 1,065 6,328 2,721 9.049
CA El Salvador 404 395 799 3,935 4.734
CA Guatemala 1,697 218 1,915 2,967 4,882
SA Guyana 5,324 252 5,576 3,192 8,768
CA Honduras 1,189 595 1,784 2,934 4,718
NA Mexico 1,195 721 1,916 18,155 20.071
CA Nicaragua 867 410 1,277 1.646 2,923
CA Panama 3.256 664 3,920 10,551 14,471
SA Paraguay 2,193 1,215 3,408 4,290 7,698
SA Peru 1,480 341 1,821 5,326 7,147
SA Suriname 2,113 210 2,323 5,571 7,894
SA Uruguay 3,621 5,549 9,170 10,330 19,500
SA Venezuela 1,086 581 1,667 13,049 14.716
(Bolivarian 
Republic of) 
The Caribbean 
Antigua and 1,003 468 1,471 37,151 38,622
Barbuda
Barbados 190 210 400 17,398 17,798
Dominica 5,274 553 5,827 14,661 20,488
Dominican 1,980 386 2,366 5,480 7,846
Republic
Grenada 572 67 639 15,444 16,083
Haiti 668 112 780 576 1,356
Jamaica 824 152 976 9,723 10.699
St. Kitts and 0 0 0 34,197 34,197
Nevis 
St. Lucia 3,394 108 3,502 13,018 16,520
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Table 7A.2 (continued)
Region Country Potential rural tax base Potential 
urban tax 
base 
Urban 
land + 
structures*
Potential 
base of 
the 
property 
tax
Cropland Pasture-
land
Cropland + 
pasture- 
land
The Caribbean
St. Vincent 2,106 109 2,215 10,041 12,256
Trinidad and 444 54 498 13,871 14,369
Tobago
Regional averages
Latin America 1,973 1,114 3.086 10.608 13,695
Central America (CA) 1,848 493 2,342 4.116 6,458
South and North 1.983 1,164 3,147 11,137 14,284
America (SA and
NA)
The Caribbean 1,232 226 1,458 5,139 6,596
Note: *As computed by Bahl and Wallace (2010). The tax base reported by the WB 
includes other produced capital that we would not tax (durable goods for example). The 
WB report follows Kunte ct al. (1998), who assume that urban land corresponds to 33% of 
the value of structures and, in turn, that structures correspond to 72% of the value of total 
capital.
Source: World Bank (2006).
Table 7A .3 Variable description and data sources
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Variable Description and sources
Property tax
collections
Fiscal
decentralization
Dependency on 
transfers
Government size
Log o f per capita 
G DP
Log of estimated 
property tax base
Urban population
Competition for 
public positions
Index o f democracy
Log o f population
Share o f  property tax collections over G DP (in percentage) 
Source: CEPAL
Share o f  subnational expenditures over total government 
expenditures (in percentage)
Source: CEPAL
Share o f intergovernmental transfers over total subnational 
revenues (in percentage)
Source: CEPAL
Government share o f  real G D P per capita (in percentage) 
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009) 
Based on per capita real GDP (in purchasing power parity, 
PPP)
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009) 
Based on the sum o f  the potential property tax base 
for rural and urban areas, as computed in Appendix 
Table 7A.2 with data from World Bank (2006). Figures 
correspond to year 2000, and are expressed on $US per 
capita
Share o f  the total population living in urban areas (in 
percentage)
Source: World Development Indicators 
Competitiveness o f  Executive Recruitment: extent to 
which subordinates enjoy equal opportunities to become 
superordinates 
Source: Polity IV Project. 2009. Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, University o f  Maryland, 
College Park, available at: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/ 
cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm  
POLITY2 is a modified version o f the POLITY, which 
is obtained by subtracting the value of the scaled value 
representing AUTOCRATIC (range 0-10) from the 
value o f DEM OCRATIC (range 0-10) in order to 
provide a unified polity scale ranging from +10 (strongly 
democratic) to -10  (strongly autocratic)
Source: Polity IV Project. 2009. Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions, University o f  Maryland, 
College Park, available at: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/ 
cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm  
Based on population (thousands)
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al.
(2009)
Table 7 A. 3 (continued)
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Variable Description and sources
Political
competition
Openness to trade
Price o f government 
expenditures
It combines two concepts: the degree o f 
institutionalization, or regulation, o f political 
competition, and the extent of government restriction 
on political competition. It ranges from 1 (suppressed 
competition) to 10 (institutionalized electoral)
Source: Polity IV Project. 2009. Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, University o f  Maryland, 
College Park, available at: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/ 
cidcm/iriscr/polity/index.htm 
Openness in constant prices: exports plus imports divided 
by real G DP per capita; Laspeyres (in percentage) 
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009) 
PPP over government consumption 
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009)
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Table 7A. 4 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std dev. Min Max Observations
Property tax overall 0.39 0.21 0.06 0.74 N = 115
collections between 0.20 0.12 0.64 n = 9
within 0.06 0.16 0.52 T-bar = 12.8
Fiscal overall 21.93 13.86 0.65 47.16 N = 115
decentralization between 13.71 1.17 44.76 n = 9
within 3.78 5.65 30.15 T-bar = 12.8
Dependency on overall 58.62 19.09 20.53 93.04 N = 115
transfers between 19.03 23.16 89.46 n = 9
within 4.21 39.44 69.23 T-bar = 12.8
Government size overall 15.22 2.92 11.39 22.55 N = 115
between 2.55 12.47 18.88 n = 9
within 1.74 8.83 19.74 T-bar = 12.8
Log of per capita overall 8.86 0.42 8.06 9.98 N = 115
GDP(PPP) between 0.41 8.20 9.36 n = 9
within 0.19 8.37 9.48 T-bar = 12.8
Per capita GDP overall 7.690 3,511 3,164 21,548 N = 115
(PPP) between 2,998 3,639 12,189 n = 9
within 1,981 2,600 17,050 T-bar = 12.8
Log of estimated overall 2.48 0.50 1.41 3.21 N = 115
property tax base between 0.56 1.41 3.21 n = 9
(per capita USS within 0.00 2.48 2.48 T-bar = 12.8
of year 2000)
Urban overall 74.21 11.21 54.66 91.80 N = 115
population between 11.36 57.21 89.59 n = 9
within 1.81 69.54 79.36 T-bar = 12.8
Competition for overall 2.71 0.53 1.00 3.00 N = 115
political positions between 0.30 2.22 3.00 n = 9
within 0.44 1.49 3.49 T-bar = 12.8
Index of overall 7.44 1.81 0.00 10.00 N = 115
democracy between 1.06 5.22 9.00 n = 9
within 1.46 2.22 10.22 T-bar = 12.8
Log of overall 10.27 0.96 8.60 12.15 N = 115
population between 1.11 8.71 12.10 n = 9
within 0.07 10.11 10.43 T-bar = 12.8
Political overall 8.27 0.99 7.00 10.00 N = 115
competition between 0.87 7.00 9.13 n = 9
within 0.67 7.16 9.71 T-bar = 12.8
Openness to overall 50.74 21.99 21.22 138.80 N = 115
trade between 24.44 23.54 107.66 n = 9
within 8.86 28.20 81.89 T-bar = 12.8
Price level o f govt overall 40.02 15.67 14.04 75.44 N = 115
expenditures between 11.87 18.07 55.91 n = 9
within 10.76 6.34 66.38 T-bar = 12.8
